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Abstract:  
This paper analyzes the effect of overlapping Trade blocs on Trade Facilitation. Using the time, 
documents and costs incurred as trade facilitation indicators, simulations show interesting yet 
important effects of an increase in Regional Trade Agreements on trade costs. The results 
suggest that when it comes to increasing regional trade agreements by 1%, costs are associated 
with an increase via the number of documents needed to export, by 0.05%, but reduce time 
delays by 0.08%. Countries related to Custom Unions are negatively affected by an increase in 
Regional Trade Agreements, with results showing that these countries face an additional burden 
of documentary compliance both for exporting and importing by 0.09% and 0.13%. Costs of 
exporting and importing are however reduced by 0.13% and 0.07% respectively. Understanding 
these effects offers important insight into how countries can better negotiate trade deals that are 
geared towards wholesome reduction of trade costs, including non-tariff barriers to trade.  
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Introduction 
There is a general consensus today that Regional Trade Agreements (RTAs) are a key and 
irreversible feature of the global trading system. The recent years have seen a considerable 
increase in the number of Regional Trade Agreements with almost every country in the world 
being part of some form of regional agreement. This proliferation of the number of RTAs as 
share of preferential trade has resulted in what has now come to be known as a ‘spaghetti bowl.’  
The Spaghetti Bowl as defined by different authors paints a picture of crisscrossing trade 
agreements characterized by very complex interactions between different and often overlapping 
regional trade agreements. Baldwin (2006) describes this overlap as a motley assortment of 
unilateral, bilateral and multilateral trade agreements among countries. Reasons for this overlap 
in RTAs include among others; the ‘domino effect’ where countries increasingly enter into RTAs 
for fear of exclusion from other RTAs, Political economy and security motivations, 
disenchantment with the multilateral processes especially the Doha Round, where countries felt 
that trade negotiations were taking a considerably longer time than desired, as well as economic 
considerations especially developing countries that consider RTAs as a platform for increasing 
economies of scale and competitive participation on the global scene.  
 
With an increase in the number of RTAs coming into force, it is difficult to ignore the 
consequences of such actions by countries especially when it comes to trade cost reductions 
across borders. It may very well be argued that while most countries would like to have lower 
costs to trade and increase their competitive edge on the global market through RTAs, it is likely 
that the depth and scope variations across these agreements imply larger administrative and 
regulatory costs. The direction of this effect is important for not just developing economies, but 
for global trade as a whole. It can be argued that the more numerous the differences between 
agreements, the greater the threat to the goal of Trade Facilitation, as they inadvertently produce 
inefficiency, and difficulties in their various areas of application and control. Various authors 
have argued that the increasingly complicated web of RTAs raises concerns about overlap, 
duplication and conflicts of rules of origin and technical standards. It could also be that having 
more RTAs can lead to further delays since more documents are required. Obtaining and 
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submitting these documents in turn would require more paperwork and potential waiting times. 
Others have also argued that the more the trade agreements, the higher the costs of negotiation. 
On the other hand however, some authors feel that the relationship between the numerous trade 
agreements and trade facilitation is not a cause for concern. They argue that in many cases trade 
facilitation is in the least bit threatened by regional trade agreements, citing for instance that 
upgrading customs and border procedures and reductions in trade costs are largely non-
discriminatory, even if the impetus for reform comes from regional rather than multilateral 
sources. They argue that many aspects of trade facilitation such as transparency and 
simplification of rules and procedures can be seen as akin to public goods, and once provided; 
they are open to be enjoyed by all trading partners, and not just countries within a particular 
regional agreement. Although this can be argued to be the case, it is still important to remember 
that in the wake of what has now come to be known as ‘New Regionalism,’ where RTAs are no 
longer viewed as a tool used to increase trade and support development, but rather involving 
much deeper aspects such as competition, labour and technology; it is possible that RTAs now 
go far beyond trade and incorporate social, economic and political objectives. It is therefore that 
the argument of similar International standards and measures of Trade facilitation may be limited 
in explaining the effect that overlapping RTAs could have on Trade facilitation. Evidence from 
studies shows that RTAs are becoming increasingly complex and in many cases establishing 
trade regimes which go beyond multilaterally agreed upon trade regulations, making it even 
more complicated to have goods cross from one border to another.  
Clearly from the previous research, authors and researchers have rather mixed thoughts on the 
issue, indicating the gap and very limited research that has been done on this correlation. Since 
the policy focus of International organizations on trade facilitation has only recently been 
enhanced, it is not surprising that limited studies have been done investigating the subject via this 
particular angle. The aim of the essay is to investigate the effect that the increase in the number 
of Trade agreements has on trade facilitation. By looking at this effect, the essay seeks to 
investigate the empirical question of whether Trade Facilitation is threatened or encouraged 
when countries engage in numerous RTAs, using measures such as the number of documents 
needed to import and export, the costs of importing and exporting as well as the time it takes to 
import and export. Answering this question could be important in discussing the policy issues 
surrounding the ‘spaghetti bowl’ and the more recent the idea of ‘New regionalism.’  This could 
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encourage policy responses such as convergence and a greater effort towards implementing 
Trade Facilitation reforms especially under the context of the increasing Regional Trade 
Agreements. The paper also investigates which type of RTA is Trade facilitation most likely to 
be compatible with, since it is possible that the different forms of regional integration affect trade 
facilitation in various ways and to different extents. The paper uses a fixed effect model with 
panel data over an 8 year period from 2006 to 2014 and includes a sample of 120 middle income 
and low income countries, excluding those countries that are part of the EU. The empirical 
results show that increases in the number of RTAs are associated with 0.05% increase in number 
of documents required to export. On the other hand, increased implementation of RTAs is 
associated with less time taken in the import and export process, reducing time delays by 0.08%. 
Countries related to Custom Unions are negatively affected by an increase in Regional Trade 
Agreements, with results showing that these countries face an additional burden of documentary 
compliance both for exporting and importing of 0.09% and 0.13% However, costs of exporting 
and importing for these countries are additionally reduced by 0.13% and 0.07% respectively. 
It is worth noting that as far as the spaghetti bowl and its effect on trade facilitation is concerned, 
very few empirical studies have been put forward to investigate this correlation, and I have not 
found any papers taking on the topic from this particular point of view. The essay therefore 
presents a platform onto which additional studies and investigations could be added.  
The rest of this paper is structured as follows: First a discussion on trading blocs and trade 
facilitation; RTA boom, Trade Facilitation implementation and compatibility. The second section 
presents the empirical strategy and results, and the last part discusses the summary and 
conclusion. 
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Trading Blocs And Trade Facilitation 
The boom in RTAs 
Compared to previous decades, the proliferation of RTAs during the last ten years has taken 
place at an unprecedented rate, with countries such and Mexico and Singapore duplicating their 
number of FTAs within a span of only 10 years (Cornejo and Harris (2007).  As of January 2005, 
312 RTAs had been notified to the GATT/WTO and a further 65 were estimated to be 
operational, although not yet notified. Of the RTAs in force, the most common category is the 
FTA, which accounts for 84 percent of all RTAs in force, while Partial scope agreements and 
Custom union agreements account for 8 percent, respectively (Crawford and Fiorentio, 2005) 
(Majluf 2004),(Krueger, 1997)). According to the World Trade Organization (WTO) there are 
275 trade agreements now in force of which almost 70% are free trade agreements (WTO 2015). 
Recent trends show that countries across the world, including those traditionally reliant on 
multilateral trade facilitation, are increasingly making RTAs the centerpiece of their commercial 
policy while also engaging in more complex trade regimes that go beyond multilaterally agreed 
upon trade regulations. This phenomenon introduces new complexities at the systemic level, 
generating also new domestic requirements for the administration of the multiple and varied 
commitments especially since the scope and depth of these RTAs differ considerably, not just in 
terms of tariff preferences but also comprehensive coverage of trade regulatory rules (Crawford 
and Fiorentio (2005), Majluf (2004) Kurz, et.al (2008)). 
 
The reasons for this general pattern and expansion of RTAs are quite varied. Most authors argue 
that one of the major reasons that countries have formed even more RTAs is because of the so 
called ‘’Domino effect’’ as first put forward by Baldwin (1993). The idea is that as the number 
of countries which are part of agreements increases, the countries that find themselves outside 
these agreements will face an increasing sense of discrimination, which in turn pushes them to 
sign new agreements even though this wouldn’t have been their first decision. This fear of 
exclusion saw a huge number of countries rushing to form more and more RTAs, especially in 
the recent past, leading to the proliferation that we see today (Baldwin (2006), Menon (2008), 
Crawford and Fiorentio (2005) Majluf (2004)). Another important argument for the increase in 
RTAs is what was perceived as a ‘sluggish progress’ in multilateral trade negotiations under the 
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Doha Development Round. Many countries felt that the WTO had failed to deliver in terms of 
trade liberalization at the multilateral level, leading them to forge their own trade agendas 
through RTAs, especially the Bilateral and Partial Scope Trade Agreements. According to 
Crawford and Fiorentio (2005), between January 2004 and February 2005 alone, 43 RTAs had 
been notified to the WTO, making it the most prolific RTA period in recorded history at that 
time. Other authors have claimed that most, if not all RTAs are politically motivated. Menon 
(2008) and Majluf (2004) argue that indeed political economy considerations are one of the 
driving forces behind a huge number of RTAs, and those political parties and politicians have a 
major role to play. Together with other authors, they argue that most governments seek to 
consolidate peace and security with their RTAs as well as increase their bargaining power in 
multilateral negotiations by first securing commitment at the regional level. Crawford and 
Fiorentio (2005) add that larger countries use RTAs to forge new alliances and diplomatic ties, 
thus ensuring or rewarding political support by providing increased discriminatory access to a 
larger market. Closely related to this is the idea that RTAs have increasingly been considered as 
trade policy instruments for deeper economic policy aims including complex strategies such as 
broader foreign policy, investment, competition, and labour standards. According to authors such 
as Kurz et.al (2008), RTAs are being embraced by WTO members as policy instruments, and in 
the best cases, as complementary to MFN. A report by UNCTAD (2004) shows that in Africa, 
regionalism has been embraced by more countries as a development strategy for bringing greater 
economies of scale and integration at the sub regional level, as well as used as a platform for 
competitive participation on the global scene. An example of such an RTA is COMESA that has 
now moved towards a customs union. 
 
With a considerable number of reasons for forming RTAs, it is obvious that as more RTAs are 
being brought into force, the more complex and tangled the spaghetti bowl becomes. As the 
focus of RTAs shifts away from merely reducing trade taxes, the task of achieving agreements 
on the multilateral level has become even more difficult, as it now has to address deeper and 
more complex issues of integration. Cornejo and Harris (2007) argue that the restructuring of 
existing agreements and the signing of new ones expands the degree of overlap of FTAs with 
different origin regimes and non-coinciding tariff elimination schedules, further complicating 
preferential trade. Majluf (2004) also mentions that the spaghetti bowl panorama makes the 
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definition of policies and instruments of regionalism as a development tool a very complex task, 
and also introduces significant complexity in evaluating the systemic and developmental impact 
of the new regionalism. 
 
Without ignoring the benefits of joining RTAs, more and more countries have become interested 
in not just reducing taxes involved in cross-border trade, but also reducing trade costs that are 
related to moving goods and services from one country to another. This has put trade facilitation 
at the forefront of trade discussions both at the multilateral and regional level, making it even 
more obvious that those countries need to address fervently the issue of non-tariff barriers to 
trade. However, with the increasing overlap witnessed today, one wonders whether the gains 
from promoting trade reforms that reduce trade costs, are actually diminished by multiple trade 
agreements, especially those that impose additional administrative and regulatory burdens. The 
task of this paper is to investigate this correlation and to show whether Trade facilitation is 
threatened or enhanced by the ‘spaghetti bowl.’ 
 
Trade Facilitation and its involvement in Regional Trade 
In regards to understanding the effect of overlapping RTAs on Trade Facilitation, we start off by 
trying to define Trade facilitation and how it can be measured. We go on to show how trade 
facilitation has been involved in Regional Trade, and what the effect has been so far, and finally 
how an increase in RTAs could affect Trade Facilitation. It is important to note that perhaps one 
of the bigger challenges in trying to understand the involvement of Trade Facilitation and its 
effect on Trade both on the multilateral and regional level, has been defining what Trade 
Facilitation is and what it actually entails. Given the broad definition of trade facilitation, various 
authors have taken the liberty to use different measures of trade facilitation, as they see fit for 
their studies. It is difficult to highlight any specific measures that are commonly used; however 
custom related measures such as transparency and predictability, fees and charges as well as 
formalities and documentation requirements are some of those used by various authors. Most 
have also excluded measures to do with standards, technical barriers and preferential rules of 
origin.  
The term ‘Trade Facilitation’ generally refers to measures aimed at reducing trade costs by 
easing the movement of goods across borders.  The most commonly used definition is the one by 
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the WTO Trade Report (2015) where they define trade facilitation as ‘the simplification and 
harmonization of international trade procedures.’ Here, International trade procedures are the 
‘activities, practices and formalities involved in collecting, presenting, communicating and 
processing data required for the movement of goods in international trade.’ Similarly, the Doha 
Ministerial Declaration (WTO, 2001) formally refers to trade facilitation as ‘expediting the 
movement, release and clearance of goods, including goods in transit.’ This terminology 
resonates  with the one given by Persson (2013), where she  loosely defines trade facilitation as 
‘reforms aimed at making it easier for traders to move goods across borders, with specific focus 
on lowering transaction costs associated with cross-border trade procedures.’ Various authors 
such as Wilson, Mann and Otuski (2003) , Shepherd and Wilson (2009) and Milner, Morrissey, 
Zgovu (2008)  have defined trade facilitation in much broader perspectives, including aspects 
such as streamlined and transparent regulatory environment, administrative procedures, customs 
formalities, competition policy, and technical barriers to trade.  They move the focus from just 
behind the border practices to domestic policies and institutional structures, where capacity 
building plays a role. Although more simplified, the Organization for Economic Co-operation 
and Development (2016) includes dimensions such as product testing and impediments to labour 
mobility into its definition of trade facilitation. In this paper trade facilitation is narrowly defined 
as the ease of movement of goods from one country to another.  
Similarly, the measures of trade facilitation are as broad as its definition, encompassing a large 
number of aspects from various authors. The most frequently used trade facilitation measure is 
from The World Bank Doing Business Database (2016) which measures the time it takes and 
costs incurred for goods to be transported from the factory gate to the shipping port. It measures 
the time and cost associated with documentary compliance, border compliance and domestic 
transport throughout the whole process of shipment of goods. The time is measured in hours, and 
1 day is 24 hours. The data are gathered through questionnaires administered to local freight 
forwarders, custom brokers, port authorities and traders, which are then followed up by 
contacting third parties and consulting public sources.  This measure has been used by several 
authors including Hummels (2001), Persson (2010) and Djankov, Freund and Pham (2010) to 
assess the effect that non-tariff barriers have on trade. Limao and Venables (1999) also use a 
similar approach, measuring the time it takes to transport a 40 feet standard container from the 
capital to the port.  The shortfall of this measure however, is that it does not take into account 
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some of the country specific unobservable factors that could affect the transportation process 
over time from one country to another. Shepherd and Wilson (2009) use a rather different 
measure of trade facilitation based on various indicators including infrastructure, institutional 
transparency, good governance and domestic regulations, while Wilson, Mann and Otsuki (2003) 
use  Port efficiency, Customs environment, Regulatory environment as well as E-business usage, 
as indicators of trade facilitation. We are however restricted from adopting some of these 
measures in our study, due to the limited data available from the Sub Saharan countries, for each 
of these categories. A more feasible measure that is used is from the World Bank Doing Business 
Trading across Borders section. This measure includes the time it takes to import goods from the 
port to the capital of a country, the documents needed to import and a 20-foot container and the 
costs involved in the import and export process. The time taken to import and export is measured 
using the number of days that goods take during transit, right from the originating country to the 
capital of the final country. The number of documents is simply the paperwork involved from the 
time that a container is to be imported from the country of origin to the final destination. This 
also involves clearance letters and permits to import and export the goods. The final indicator 
measures   the cost involved in the import and export process, such as documentary compliance, 
border compliance as well as domestic transport. Previous authors using this measure have 
provided evidence that a 10% reduction in relative delays increases imports by about 4%. 
Turning now to how Trade Facilitation has been involved in Regional Trade Agreements 
(RTAs), recent patterns and trends show that Trade Facilitation provisions were almost non-
existent in early RTAs. However governments began to realize the need to expand their trade 
agenda and look beyond tariff polices (Neufeld (2014) Tadashi (2014) Moïsé (2002)). Tadashi 
(2014) shows that recent RTAs have incorporated many articles for Trade Facilitation measures, 
partly because many governments have recognized that the benefits arising from preferential 
tariffs of an RTA could be impacted by unnecessary costs and delays at the borders. Thus Trade 
Facilitation has been increasingly considered critical to boasting intra-regional trade. Measures in 
the areas of transparency and predictability as well as customs cooperation are more frequently 
observed in RTAs than others. Factors influencing the implementation of Trade Facilitation in 
RTAs include among others; the date when the agreement was concluded, the type of RTA, level 
of development of signatories, number of RTAs concluded, special interest of key signatories 
and well as geography (Neufeld (2014) and Tadashi (2014). It is however important to note that 
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individual treaties can differ in how they address Trade Facilitation measures, especially since 
there is no shared definition of Trade Facilitation (Beckford, 2014).  Neufeld (2014) argues that 
RTAs have become diverse with their Trade Facilitation content, varying considerably as far as 
scope, precision and level of ambition. Beckford (2014) adds that the factors such as the 
definition of the Trade Facilitation used; the category of commitments to be enforced when the 
agreement takes place, and the pace of these various commitments, affects the impact of Trade 
Facilitation measures in RTAs. 
 
As earlier noted, there are have been considerable descriptive studies on the relationship between 
regional trade and trade facilitation, however very few of these are empirical. Nonetheless, those 
that have tried to study the effects of trade facilitation on regional trade have shown that 
generally trade facilitation has a positive impact on regional Trade as it reduces costs of 
importing and exporting goods especially costs brought about by time delays. A paper by Kurz, 
et.al (2008) where they investigate the impact of trade facilitation on trade flows in the SADC 
region, using time, costs and documents required as trade facilitation measures, shows that time 
required to import and export is the most important source of trade facilitation. They argue that 
time is consistent with costs associated with longer processes for managing external trade in 
border customs offices. They put forward an idea; ‘Make it quicker’ which in practice means to 
double human resources in the customs office or even to expand customs infrastructure at the 
border, in addition to improving infrastructure (highways, railways, ports and airports) in order 
to move goods more quickly from one country to the other. Their analysis shows that although 
exporters do not object to tariff reductions negotiated at the regional level through RTAs, cost 
reductions via better infrastructure and a shorter waiting time at the border have a much higher 
cost reducing impact than tariff reductions could have. Using an example from Namibia, Zambia 
and Botswana, Maur (2008) highlights the importance of having harmonized standards in these 
countries and how they could reduce trade costs, if the countries worked together. He gives an 
example of the different transport standards such as varying axle loads permissible for trucks 
between these countries, and the changing rail gauges width for trains that necessitate unloading 
and reloading of goods, which in turn disrupt the supply chain. He adds that compliance with 
different regulations at each border increases compliance costs as well as the time that is spent in 
transit. He also mentions the costs of duplication that are magnified by the number of 
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regulations, such as entry visa requirements, technical and phyto-sanitary standards, security 
checks, etc, all of which involve producing paper documentation at border posts, storage in 
bonded warehouses and physical inspections. An example by Maur (2008) shows how costs were 
reduced through shared border administration, where Norway, Sweden and Finland signed cross 
border cooperation agreements which allowed them to share the cost of individually manning the 
1,630km long border between Norway and Sweden, and the 739km long border between Norway 
and Finland, making the costs of border surveillance and customs administration a lot less costly 
for the individual countries. Schiff and Winters (2003) give the example of COMESA’s regional 
carrier’s licensing system which helps traders avoid paying multiple licenses, thus tackling 
duplication at the regional level. Another example is the Yellow Card or Third Party Regional 
Motor Vehicle Insurance scheme under COMESA, which allows traders to purchase insurance 
covering transport in the region (Arvis, 2005). These studies together with some others (Moïsé, 
2002), support the idea that trade facilitation needs to be encouraged at the regional level. 
   
Concerning developing countries, which are economically too small to offer full range of 
standards conformity assessment, the World Bank (2005) recommends that they could benefit 
from regional integration by setting up regional accreditation bodies that could provide cheaper 
and better testing, building on economies of scale and comparative advantage. The World Bank 
(2005) also lists several areas of facilitation in which they view RTAs can lead to improvement 
and these include: alignment of customs codes with international standards; simplification and 
harmonization of procedures (e-documents and single document); alignment of tariff structures 
with the HS; transparency; effective implementation of the WTO valuation agreement; joint 
work towards customs integrity; establishment of joint border posts; and joint training centers. 
 
From the studies discussed, it is clear to see that Trade Facilitation is indeed a vital part of trade 
at the regional level that need not be compromised. Through harmonized standards and 
regulations, efficient customs procedures, as well as improved and well coordinated 
infrastructure, trade both at the regional and multilateral level increases with less cumbersome 
procedures and costs. The empirical reality demonstrated by the gravity model (Anderson and 
Wincoop, 2004) where a country’s trade flows are negatively affected by the trade barriers such 
as distance and enhanced when countries share the same language, legal systems, history, etc, is 
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clear evidence that both ‘natural’ and geographical barriers to trade create costly obstacles to 
International trade, and one of the important ways to deal with them is through trade facilitation 
(Maur, 2008). 
 
Trade Facilitation and overlapping Trade Agreements 
Considering the importance of Trade facilitation in promoting regional trade, the question still 
falls on whether actual impact is realized through its implementation. It is interesting to see from 
the existing body of research that, although most recent RTAs have incorporated some form of 
Trade Facilitation reforms in their agreements, there still exists a gap between the inclusion of 
these reforms and their actual implementation. Maur (2008) highlights that despite being broad 
in scope; many existing regional agreements are more shallow than deep when it comes to Trade 
facilitation, thus offering quite a lot of flexibility to members to escape enforcement. Indeed, he 
finds that in the case of EU, beyond the upward harmonization for the internal market, the most 
ambitious attempts at facilitation of trade on standards have been through stand alone mutual 
recognition agreements and are limited to conformity assessment. Moïsé (2002) mentions that 
indeed RTAs generally fall short of common rules and procedures, and although harmonization 
is high on the agenda in some RTAs, facilitation mostly rests on common principles that are 
tailored to the specific circumstances of each participating country and as result, implementation 
is somewhat different in each country. Duval, et. al(2016) add that commitments made through 
trade agreements are not necessarily a good proxy for actual implementation in the ground, since 
RTAs typically have very weak dispute resolution mechanisms, with no penalties or mechanisms 
in place to ensure a commitment will be effectively implemented. They find a weak positive 
correlation between the depth of trade facilitation commitments made by a country through its 
RTAs and actual implementation. Indeed the question of strong political will to implement these 
reforms comes into play when it comes to commitment (Maur, 2008). 
 
As highlighted by Beckford (2014), measuring trade impact from the Trade facilitation 
agreements is a task filled with uncertainty, since it depends on several factors some of which 
include the mere definition of trade facilitation, commitment of involved parties and the 
quantification of some Trade facilitation measures that may require subject and structural factors 
to come into play, for example judicial appeals. Neufeld (2014) and Maur (2008) show that in 
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addition to no- or very limited arrangements for technical assistance and capacity building, RTAs 
do not have a forceful ability to enforce their Trade facilitation commitments as a result of not 
being endowed with a binary system of dispute resolution. Maur (2008) mentions that the poor 
record on transit illustrates the more general failure of most regional institutions to deliver 
tangible trade facilitation reform, The EU, and to a lesser extent the APEC being among the 
exceptions. He argues that today the enforcement in RTAs limits the scope of trade facilitation to 
few dimensions which aim at simplifying the job of the customs authorities, which include 
transparency requirements with frequent reference to GATT articles, for example. On the other 
hand, harmonization is only limited to better mutual understanding of day-to-day operations. In 
Africa, Mc Tiernan (2006) reports that only COMESA and the trans-Kalahari corridor (an ad hoc 
transit cooperation agreement) have provoked changes in customs practice.  
 
Perhaps the bigger issue when it comes to impact of trade facilitation on trade in Regional 
Agreements is that of trade diversion affects, that usually arises from discrimination. According 
to UNCTAD (2004) this is likely to happen when trade facilitation measures have their own 
discriminatory effect. Although for most trade facilitation measures this is not the case, the report 
argues that a possibility for several important policies such as mutual recognition and transport 
infrastructure policies, if left to just a privileged group in the RTA, is likely to bring about 
discrimination. It is important to note however, that recent studies on the issue of discrimination 
and trade facilitation in regional trade agreement are still rather mixed. While there is caution 
especially from International Trade bodies about what effects could arise from countries 
pursuing their own individual reforms, there are general findings that when it comes to the 
regional level, most (but not all) trade facilitation measures are similar to those that are 
internationally recognized. Most authors find that the Trade facilitation measures discussed and 
also those being implemented at the bilateral level are indeed compatible with International 
standards. As highlighted by Tadashi (2014), it is not practical for a customs administration to 
identify the goods or persons that are eligible for a measure, as significant financial resources 
and time are required to manage the system and allow for such differentiation. In the same spirit 
Duval, et. al (2016) find evidence that trade facilitation provisions in RTAs result in multilateral 
non-discriminatory trade costs reduction over time. However, this doesn’t mean that some Trade 
Facilitation measures are not open for discrimination. The same authors explain that the 
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discriminatory effect could arise for certain measures even if implemented on a non-
discriminatory basis; where some countries  that are already regular trading partners benefit more 
than those that are geographically or culturally further apart. Maur (2008) adds that indeed 
enforcement of border agency controls is still highly localized especially near border crossings, 
which means that third parties to the RTA agreements still incur costs.  
 
An important argument that could perhaps bring a good conclusion to the issue of discrimination 
is that for trade facilitation to work, it requires not only the elimination of distortionary and 
inefficient rules and practices, but also that there is an ambitious and positive agenda of reform 
that includes internationally compatible legislation, systems and skills.  Schiff and Winters 
(2003) argue that making policies more compatible undoubtedly involves strong political will to 
fight against the vested interests in border agencies as well as a different institutional setting than 
the classical exchange of trade concessions. In short, stronger and more permanent institutions 
than those of multilateral trade negotiations are needed because implementation of trade 
facilitation reforms will require at least coordination, and more likely, harmonization and mutual 
recognition of rulings. The limitations to the actual impact of trade facilitation appear to be rather 
complex and not as straight forward as theory would suggest. However, given such difficulties 
faced at the regional level, the much debated question then becomes; what happens to trade 
facilitation when even more RTAs are involved.  
 
Trade Facilitation and the Spaghetti Bowl. 
Authors such as Sopranzetti (2017) argue that it is likely that with overlapping trade agreements, 
the mere costs of negotiation have increased. Maur (2008) argues that when RTAs involve more 
than two partners, questions of administration, costs and transit management are raised. He adds 
that RTAs have contributed to create new impediments to trade, which require more 
sophisticated trade facilitation measures because border formalities become more complex, 
especially when it comes to discriminating between preferential and non-preferential trade. As 
earlier discussed, the recent trend for most countries has been to sign numerous RTAs, and as of 
today, almost all countries in the world are part of some form of regional agreement. This picture 
becomes even more tangled considering how vastly different these RTAs are in terms of 
political, and economic dimensions. An example from Crawford and Fiorentio (2005) shows that 
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compared to Europe, RTA dynamics in the Western Hemisphere are more heterogeneous in 
nature with several major players engaged in multilayered RTA processes and not necessarily 
sharing similar objectives. They add that negotiation and administration of multiple agreements 
is likely to strain the institutional capacity of even the largest countries and in some cases, 
exporters may choose to forgo the preferential rates offered under an RTA, if the margin of 
preference is not large enough to offset the administrative burden of complying with the rules. 
Various authors, including a report from UNCTAD (2004) cite that membership of multiple 
RTAs places a tremendous burden on the administrative capacity of countries especially small 
and developing countries. Kreuger (1997) argues that with overlaps, even more export of 
protection and disputes with customs over origin and satisfaction of rules of origin would likely 
result. He adds that inevitably, the customs clearance process itself would become more 
complex.  
 
Cornejo and Harris (2007) argue that the overlapping of agreements in matters of origin impacts 
negatively on national authorities and economic operators, increasing operating costs for both. 
They add that managing non-preferential imports alone poses challenges for customs such as 
reconciling contradictory goals in matters relating to trade facilitation, security, control, and the 
application for risk analysis criteria. Another argument they put forward is that the existence of 
hundreds of tariff elimination baskets with different speeds, and product compositions, and the 
management and application of different origin requirements, certification and verification 
system, increase the complexity of the task. When it comes to the supply side of goods, trade 
becomes even more complicated for producers that have to incorporate additional accounting 
requirements such as different methods of calculating regional value, requirements for inventory 
management of finished products, and inputs, all of which are not technically feasible and 
generate higher costs. Menon (2008) goes a step further to explain that with overlaps, comes not 
just the increased cost of doing business, but also welfare losses that are associated with trade 
diversion due to inconsistencies between various elements of the agreements. These could 
include different schedules for phasing out tariffs, different rules of origin, exclusions, 
conflicting standards, and differences in rules dealing with anti-dumping and other regulations 
and policies. He adds that it may not always be easy to implement some of these policies by 
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‘folding several FTAs together’ that have different tariff rates and innumerable rules of origin, 
which are often defined differently by product. 
 
When it comes to developing countries, Maur (2008) shows that regional corridor agreements in 
Sub-Saharan African are largely not operational for most of the transit traffic, and are superseded 
by national, non-harmonized, overlapping and discriminatory provisions such as: compulsory 
customs escort, non-harmonized transit charges, or specific country documentation for transit. 
Even worse is that administrative burden adds to the regulatory burden, with lack of coordination 
between different agencies in charge of controlling transit goods (customs, police, sanitary 
controls) and all this brings about  inefficiency of these agencies which multiplies the costs of 
trade. Caution from Crawford and Fiorentio (2005) to developing countries (and to some extent 
developed countries), is that development of complex networks of non-MFN trade relations and 
of regulatory regimes which increasingly touch upon policy areas unchartered by multilateral 
trade agreements may place them in a weaker position than under the multilateral framework. 
They add that such RTA proliferation is already undermining transparency and predictability in 
international relations, through trade and investment diversion.  
 
Thus far, it appears that more complex and deep regional integration may for the above reasons 
pose threats to the elimination of cross border trade barriers. Most authors seems to fear that the 
overlap of the RTAs will bring about a complicated web of trade policy issues that would 
eventually be too deep and too difficult for particular countries to untangle, thus the efforts 
towards easier and less costly movement of goods from one country to another would be a much 
prolonged goal. 
 
As earlier mentioned however, there are some other authors that are rather optimistic about the 
relationship between the ‘spaghetti bowl’ and how it could affect trade facilitation. Much of this 
optimism stems from the ideas that even though countries are increasingly involved in various 
trade agreements, the goal to ease cross border trade for most countries still remains, leading to 
possible convergence of these policies and reforms, and a high degree of non-discrimination in 
their implementation. Indeed, one would argue that although the above arguments are to be 
considered seriously, the picture painted by the ‘pessimists’ seems rather grim and quite 
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inconclusive  especially since their arguments are taken from just a few aspects of trade 
facilitation, such as the rules of origin. Other facets of trade facilitation such as use of modern 
technology to induce faster clearance procedures and encourage efficiency at customs units, 
quicker dissemination of information on requirements and regulations to all trading partners, 
proper training of management and staff to enhance productivity, fostering increasing 
cooperation and communication between officials from different government agencies to 
encourage better coordination, use of audit based control measures during customs clearing, 
transparency and risk management, and coupled with increased capacity building, better 
infrastructure and institutions, could be applied on a non-discriminatory basis, and thus see more 
countries reap gains from trade facilitation and still part of a large number of Regional trade 
agreements. 
 
Based on some of these arguments, the objective of this paper is not only to empirically 
investigate the correlation that exists between Trade Facilitation and the increased number of 
Regional Agreements, but to also investigate which types of Regional Trade Agreements are 
more likely to be compatible with Trade Facilitation measures. As mentioned by Menon (2008), 
a general limitation of the proposals put forward in dealing with the spaghetti bowl effect is that 
they tend to implicitly group all kinds of RTAs together as a homogenous group. What most 
countries forget however is that these proposals are critical in determining whether or not a 
particular remedy is likely to be effective in minimizing the negative effect of the spaghetti bowl, 
based on how they operate under these different types of RTAs.  It is therefore important to 
define the different ways in which different types of Regional Trade Agreements might interact 
with Trade Facilitation measures, bearing in mind that the effect of increased Regional Trade 
Agreements could vary tremendously, depending on the type of Regional Agreement that a 
country is involved with. Unfortunately, views on which type of RTAs are more compatible with 
Trade Facilitation are rather mixed. While some studies argue that Trade Facilitation measures 
thrive better under the Customs Union set up, based on factors such as diminished rules of origin 
among members, and stronger institutions which allow them to carry out more ambitious reforms 
(Maur, 2008), other authors like Crawford and Fiorentio (2005)  support the idea that since FTAs 
are faster to conclude  and require a lower degree of policy coordination among members, they 
are less complicated and a viable option for Trade Facilitation to thrive. Given such varying 
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views on the compatibility of RTAs with Trade Facilitation, it is therefore that this paper 
investigates these effects. 
Empirical-Strategy 
An empirical difficulty faced by most researchers in trying to find a causal relationship between 
two variables is the possibility that the investigation is influenced by unobservable factors that 
can affect countries over time. The most common way to control for these factors is to employ 
the Fixed Effects Model. Many researchers use the model to control for unobserved 
heterogeneity related to specific country and individual effects. Although this study is interested 
in simply investigating a correlation between the two main variables, it is still important to 
exploit the structure of the fixed effects estimator that allows us to control for the differences that 
may exist across and within the countries. Coupled with the basic fixed effect model are time 
fixed effects that are used to control for factors that could affect countries over time such as 
business cycles, climate, etc. 
The baseline models of this paper are made up of trade facilitation indicators including the time 
it takes to import and export goods from one country to another, the documents needed to import 
and export as well as the costs involved in the export and import process. A total of six 
specifications, measuring the importing and exporting estimations for each indicator, are used as 
dependent variables. The number of regional trade agreements implemented by a country is used 
as the main explanatory variable, together with GDP and Population variables. Dummy variables 
for the time fixed effects are also included to the model.  
Data and Sample 
The study uses a sample consisting of 120 middle income and low income countries, excluding 
those that belong to the EU. The selection of this sample was based on the empirical evidence 
that shows that increases in the number of RTAs in the most recent years has mostly been 
amongst middle income and low income countries. Other factors such as degree of homogeneity 
of their level of economic growth, colonial influence, cultural and religious diversity, and 
geographical location were considered. The study focuses on Regional Trade Agreements that 
are already implemented by these countries over the time period 2006-2014. This time period is 
chosen because it is the between these years that the world has seen the biggest proliferation of 
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RTAs, and also because it is the longest period for consistent data on Trade Facilitation 
indicators.  
The sample countries are at more or less similar levels of economic growth, much of which has 
been influenced by the quality of their institutions, colonial influence, and culture. These 
countries have faced similar colonial powers that established common official languages, 
systems and influenced the way that they developed past their colonial times. It is statistically 
evident that these countries share similar challenges such as poor infrastructure, corruption and 
low levels of technology, all of which affect their economic growth and International trade. 
Having this level of homogeneity allows us to compare these countries much easier, without 
having to control for a large number of unique factors for each individual country. A bigger 
factor that comes into play is that these countries have had stronger motivations to increase their 
membership to various trading blocs. More than the advanced countries, middle income and low 
income countries have played into the ‘Domino Effect’ over the recent years, due to the 
increased fear of discrimination. Similarly, middle income and low income governments have 
felt the need to increase their bargaining power in multinational negotiations by first securing 
commitment at the regional level. In Africa, especially, countries have used Regional Trade 
Agreements as a development strategy for bringing greater economies of scale, and as a platform 
for competitive participation on the global scene.  
On the other hand, when including the middle income and low income countries that are part of 
the EU, it is important to consider that the number of Regional Trade Agreements that each 
country has is not easily separable from its individual motivations for having such a large 
number of RTAs implemented. Approximately 40 Regional Trade Agreements have been signed 
by the EU as a Customs Union, with different countries, joining at different periods of time. The 
task of disentangling these time periods from the number of RTAs for each of these countries is 
quite tedious and very time consuming. There is also an increased risk of Endogeneity when it 
comes to these countries. For these reasons, the study considered these countries unique to the 
sample, and thus was excluded. 
In most recent studies, Trade Facilitation has been measured using various indicators. This study 
uses the time it takes to import and export goods from one country to another, the costs involved 
as well as the documents required, as measures of trade facilitation. The time is measured in the 
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days that it takes for goods to be moved from the country of origin, to the final destination, costs 
are measured in US. Dollars and they exclude insurance costs and informal payments for which 
no receipt is issued. Documents are any paperwork involved that are mandatory for exporting 
and importing. Data for these indicators is taken from the World Bank’s Doing Business 
Database (2017). The Doing Business database records the time and cost associated with the 
logistical process of importing and exporting goods. It measures the time and cost associated 
with documentary compliance, border compliance and domestic transport throughout the whole 
process of shipment of goods. The time is measured in hours, and 1 day is 24 hours. 
Documentary compliance captures the time and cost associated with compliance with the 
documentary requirements of all government agencies of the origin economy, destination 
economy and any transit economies. This time and cost could be the time spent to get the 
document issued and stamped, gathering information and preparing documents such as customs 
declaration or certificate of origin. All electronic or paper submissions of information requested 
by any government agency in connection with the shipment are considered to be documents 
obtained, prepared and submitted during the export and import process. The aim is to measure 
the total burden of preparing the bundle of documents that will enable completion of the 
international trade from the product and partner. The data are gathered through questionnaires 
administered to local freight forwarders, custom brokers, port authorities and traders, which are 
then followed up by contacting third parties and consulting public sources. To ensure consistency 
in data collection for the period over which the study is done, data after 2014 is excluded from 
the study because in 2015, the Doing Business database uses a new approach to measuring the 
trade process, where they now consider the product of comparative advantage for each economy 
when measuring export procedures and focus on a single very common manufactured product for 
import procedures. Changes in methodology are aimed at increasing the economic and policy 
relevance of the indicators, reflecting actual directions and volumes of trade. These changes 
however do not render our choice of data source and methodology irrelevant. 
Data for the rest of the variables included in the model are obtained from standard sources. Data 
on the number of Regional Trade Agreements was obtained from the World Trade Organization 
(2017). Data for GDP is measured in current US dollars and was obtained from the World Bank 
Development Indicators database (2017). Data from Population was obtained from the United 
Nations Population Division database (2017). 
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Empirical Specification 
The baseline fixed effects model is estimated in logarithm form as follows: 
EQUATION (1)    
𝑙𝑛𝑇𝐹𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖  + 𝛽2𝑙𝑛𝑁𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟𝑜𝑓𝑅𝑇𝐴𝑠 𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3𝑙𝑛𝐺𝐷𝑃 𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽4𝑃𝑂𝑃𝑖𝑡   + 𝜆𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡  
Where 𝑇𝐹𝑖𝑡 is the trade facilitation indicator, measured for each country i at time t. The 
explanatory variable of interest is 𝑙𝑛𝑁𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟𝑜𝑓𝑅𝑇𝐴𝑠 𝑖𝑡 which is the number of regional trade 
agreements implemented by country i at time t. This variable measures the correlation between 
trade facilitation and overlapping trade agreements. The variable will show what happens to 
trade facilitation, measured different by time, cost and documentation, when the number of 
RTAs that a country is involved with increases. Other explanatory variables include each 
country’s GDP and their Population. 𝜆𝑡 are the dummy variables controlling for time fixed 
effects. 𝜀𝑖𝑡 is the disturbance term. 
To measure the correlation between different types of Regional Trade Agreements and trade 
facilitation, additional specifications are made. An interaction variable between the type of 
Regional Trade Agreement and the number of RTAs is included to the baseline model, to 
investigate the relationship. Two different types of Regional Trade Agreements are used, 
including Customs Unions, and Free Trade Agreements.  
The estimated model is as shown below: 
 
EQUATION (2) 
𝑙𝑛𝑇𝐹𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖  + 𝛽2𝑙𝑛𝑁𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟𝑜𝑓𝑅𝑇𝐴𝑠 𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3𝑙𝑛𝐺𝐷𝑃 𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽4𝑃𝑂𝑃𝑖𝑡 +   𝐵5𝑙𝑛𝑁𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟𝑜𝑓𝑅𝑇𝐴𝑠 𝑖𝑡
∗ 𝐶𝑈𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽6𝑙𝑛𝑁𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟𝑜𝑓𝑅𝑇𝐴𝑠 𝑖𝑡 ∗ 𝐹𝑇𝐴𝑖𝑡  + 𝜆𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡  
Where: 𝐵5𝑙𝑛𝑁𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟𝑜𝑓𝑅𝑇𝐴𝑠 𝑖𝑡 ∗ 𝐶𝑈𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽6𝑙𝑛𝑁𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟𝑜𝑓𝑅𝑇𝐴𝑠 𝑖𝑡 ∗ 𝐹𝑇𝐴𝑖𝑡   are interaction 
variables between the number of RTAs and Customs Union, and  Number of RTAs and Free 
Trade Agreements, respectively, for each country i at time t. Each of these variables measures 
the compatibility between Custom Unions (CU) and Free Trade Agreements (FTA) and trade 
Facilitation, measured with the same indicators as in the baseline equation. Each interaction 
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variable is given by the product of the number of RTAs variable and a dummy variable for 
Custom Union and FTA respectively, each taking on the value 1 if a country is part of this type 
of RTA at time t and the value 0 if not. Each variable estimates whether a country related to, for 
example, a CU is influenced more or less by an increase in number of RTAs. The number of 
RTAs variable still measures the direct effect between Trade Facilitation and RTA overlap, just 
as in equation (1). The rest of the variables continue to estimate the same effects as in the 
baseline model. 
The dependant variable is Trade facilitation measured by time, cost and documents required in 
the import and export of goods of country i. Costs are measured in US dollars, time is measured 
in number of days it takes to import goods from the capital of one country to another, while 
documents is the number of letters, certificates and other forms of verification needed. The study 
excludes other indicators of trade facilitation such as infrastructure, since they are much harder 
to measure and monitor, and have limited data availability. 
Gross Domestic Product (GDP) and population for each country are used as controls in the 
model. Both variables control for country’s size, but one from a nominal perspective (GDP) 
while the other in real terms. Together, they also control for the income level since an increase in 
GDP, given the size of the population implies that the income per capital increases. These 
variables capture both market size changes and income changes (GDP per capita). If GDP 
increases, the market size increases, but at the same time, income increases, even if the size of 
the population is unchanged. A large market size is usually good indication of trading capacity of 
the country, and thus increased international trade. There is empirical evidence of this effect by 
the gravity model (Anderson and Wincoop, 2004) where a country’s trade flows are positively 
affected by GDP and population. On the one hand, it can be argued that countries that have a 
large trade value have vested interests in being part of international and regional trade, and 
therefore improve the ease with which goods move across borders. It can therefore be expected 
that countries with larger GDP would be heavily interested in investing in trade facilitation by 
reducing the costs and time required to import and export, thus a negative sign on the dependant 
variable. On the other hand however, a negative impact on trade costs could arise with higher 
degree of corruption, or limited institutional capability, which in turn increases time delays, 
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documentary compliance and costs, thus giving a positive sign. Both GDP and Population can 
affect Trade facilitation negatively or positively. 
The number of RTAs variable measures the increased overlap of regional trade agreements. This 
is the most important explanatory variable and it shows the correlation between trade facilitation 
and increased number of trading blocs. This is measured by the number of regional agreements 
that a country has implemented within a given period of time. It is possible that the effect of this 
coefficient on the dependant variable could either be negative or positive. One reason for a 
positive effect could be that the more RTAs a country implements, the more complex the rules 
and regulations required for import and export. The number of documents is also expected to 
increase due to additional rules and special requirements. Adhering to these various rules of 
origin, research of information and even changing product design to suit various standards could 
make the import and export process more complicated, thus increasing the costs and time delays 
at the border. On the other hand a negative sign can also be expected, since it’s possible that 
increased number of RTAs has both a non-discriminatory and convergence effect, where the 
standards could be harmonized, rules and regulations minimized, and capacity required in 
dealing with customs and border control across countries is increased. A similar effect is 
expected for the interaction variable. The interaction variable estimates whether a country that is 
related to a particular type of RTA, is influenced more or less by the number of RTAs. The effect 
of this coefficient on the dependant variable is just as ambiguous as the effect of increased 
number of RTAs. Depending on the dominating positive or negative effect of overlap on trade 
facilitation, the type of regional trade agreement is likely to be affected the same way. 
Estimation Issues 
The study uses a Fixed Effects estimation model to estimate the relationship between Trade 
Facilitation and overlapping trade blocs. This estimator has an advantage over the Ordinary Least 
Squares Estimator (OLS) because it maintains consistent estimates even when there are 
unobserved factors that affect the dependent variable and are correlated with the observed 
regressor. Given the panel structure of our model, the OLS estimator would be biased due to 
endogeneity and heteroskedasticity. It is not possible to deal with this kind of heteroskadascticy 
under OLS by simply applying a robust covariance matrix and therefore choosing an estimator 
that is able to deal with it, is a much viable option. The Fixed effect estimator remains consistent 
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under heteroskadascticy, by looking ‘within’ each country and controlling for the country 
specific differences across the countries that are related to the explanatory variables.  This is very 
important for our dataset because other factors such as past political environment, security and 
national policies, that could affect how many regional agreements a country engages into, are 
likely to affect our results, if not controlled for. However, one limitation of this estimation model 
is that for some time-invariant variables, there could be problems of perfect collinearity, 
although this is most likely in bilateral estimations of trade flows. 
To control for factors that influence all countries in a similar way over time, a Time Fixed 
Effects Estimator is included in the model. The quality of the Fixed Effects model depends on 
the extent of variation of the regressor over time i.e. time differences. It is therefore important to 
capture factors such as business cycles, climate, etc, that affect the countries in the same way 
over time. 
Using several measures of trade facilitation ensures that we study the effect of the overlap, over 
more than just one indicator. This allows us to not only have a variety of results for analysis, but 
to also check for robustness of results. 
Table 1: Summary Statistics for Key Variables 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
VARIABLES N Mean Standard deviation min max 
      
Num of RTAS 1,688 3.829 3.349 0 22 
GDP 1,693 3.177e+15 2.729e+15 1.311e+08 9.991e+15 
Population 1,746 3.210e+12 4.000e+13 9,894 5.501e+14 
Docs to export 1,256 7.145 1.962 3 15 
Time to export 1,270 27.91 15.97 8 102 
Cost to export 1,270 1,537 1,049 390 9,050 
Docs to import 1,256 8.363 2.591 3 21 
Time to import 1,269 33.57 24.26 7 339 
Cost to import 1,269 1,966 1,935 317 24,845 
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Empirical Results 
The regression analysis using the Fixed Effects model was generally successful. Table 2 shows 
the regression results and standard errors of running equation (1), as the main baseline model 
while table 3 shows results for equation (2). 
Table 2: Summary of Main Results; The Effect of overlapping regional trade agreements on 
trade facilitation. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES Docs 
export 
Cost 
export 
Time 
export 
Docs 
import 
Cost 
import 
Time 
import 
       
No. of RTAs 0.0525** 0.0605 -0.0871* 0.0170 0.0455 -0.0899* 
 (0.0236) (0.0519) (0.0484) (0.0297) (0.0542) (0.0540) 
GDP 0.00428 0.00287 0.00316 0.00326 0.00269 0.00277 
 (0.00285) (0.00247) (0.00196) (0.00247) (0.00270) (0.00290) 
Population 0.105** 0.0716 0.125** 0.0395 0.0539 0.134* 
 (0.0443) (0.112) (0.0630) (0.0542) (0.0895) (0.0709) 
Constant 0.171 6.106*** 1.115 1.408 7.803*** 2.230 
 (0.715) (1.782) (1.033) (0.877) (1.677) (1.419) 
       
Observations 1,149 1,163 1,163 1,149 1,162 1,162 
R-squared 
Country Effects 
Time-Fixed 
Effects 
0.102 
Yes 
 
Yes 
0.208 
Yes 
 
Yes 
0.381 
Yes 
 
Yes 
0.109 
Yes 
 
Yes 
0.210 
Yes 
 
Yes 
0.201 
Yes 
 
Yes 
No. of countries 120 120 120 120 120 120 
                                       Robust standard errors in parentheses 
                                          *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
The coefficient for the GDP is not easily interpretable since results are statistically insignificant 
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and close to zero. It can be argued that with further information on factors affecting these 
countries, the results could be different. Omitted variable effects and small sample size, 
restricting variations could also affect the results. 
 
Results for the population coefficient show positive signs, although the results are statistically 
significant for only two of the indicators. The results show that there is a statistically significant 
positive effect of population on the documents needed to export and time taken to export, with 
coefficients (0.105**) and (0.125**) respectively. This can be interpreted as a 1% increase in 
population increases the cost in exporting through an increase in the number of documents 
needed to export by 0.1% and an increase in time delays by 0.125%. The results for the other 
trade facilitation indicators are not statistically significant. As earlier noted however, the effect of 
this variable could have also been the opposite.  
On a rather interesting note, the results for the main explanatory variable are mixed with varying 
signs. The coefficient for the number of regional trade agreements is an indicator for overlapping 
trade blocs, and it measures the effect that an increase in RTAs has on trade facilitation. This is 
the core analysis of this paper. A statistically positive effect is obtained for the number of RTAs 
on the documents required to export, with a coefficient of (0.0525**). The interpretation of this 
result is that if the number of RTAs increases by 1%, then the costs of exporting in the number of 
documents increases by 0.05%, assuming that both the number of Regional Trade Agreements 
and number of documents are continuous over time. Another statistically significant result is for 
the Time taken during the export and import process. For both these indicators, there is a 
negative effect, with coefficients (-0.0871*) for time taken to export and (-0.0899*) for time 
taken to import. This shows that as the number of RTAs increases by 1%, the time delays reduce 
by 0.08% during both importing and exporting.  
A possible explanation for the positive effect on the number of documents to export could be that 
an increase in the number of RTAs increases the documents needed in the certification and 
verification process of exporting. It is possible that having more RTAs as a country, could 
increase the rules and regulations that traders have to comply with, such as rules of origin, as 
well as increases accounting requirements that may include regional value on products and 
requirements for inventory management. This not only increases the documents required for 
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custom processing and clearance but also the administrative burden of complying with these 
rules. Unharmonized and country specific documentation for transit are also likely to increase the 
documents required in the export process, leading to higher trade costs. On the other hand, an 
increase in the number of RTAs could imply better use and exchange of modern technology as 
well as a faster convergence of policies and reforms that are non-discriminatory, and this could 
be a possible explanation for the negative effect of the number of RTAs on time delays. Use of 
modern technology induces faster custom clearance procedures, and efficiency at border units. 
There is also quicker dissemination of information on requirements and regulations to trading 
partners, as well as better use of audit based control during customs clearing, and risk 
management. It is also possible that with increased RTAs, there is shared institutional capacity 
building and infrastructural development. All these factors, if taken into consideration are 
plausible explanations for the results that we see i.e. an increase in the number of documents for 
exporting, due to an increase in RTAs, but at the same time decrease in time delays, and close to 
zero impact on the costs of exporting. A plausible reason could be that if the number of 
documents needed to export increases by the number of RTAs,  the trade costs also increase but 
at the same time these costs decrease due to a reduction in  time delays during export, thus the 
zero impact that we see on the Cost to export variable.  
Table 3: Effect of type of RTA on Trade Facilitation. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES Docs  
export 
Cost  
export 
Time 
export 
Docs 
import 
Cost  
import 
Time 
import 
       
No. of RTAs 0.0468** 0.0686 -0.0887* 0.00740 0.0542 -0.0926* 
 (0.0233) (0.0540) (0.0493) (0.0296) (0.0564) (0.0545) 
Custom Union 0.0938* -0.131* 0.0363 0.134* -0.0743** 0.141 
 (0.0559) (0.0704) (0.0441) (0.0803) (0.0361) (0.0901) 
FTA -0.00165 0.0146 0.00368 0.00332 -0.00177 -0.0123 
 (0.00547) (0.0107) (0.00789) (0.00644) (0.0135) (0.0153) 
GDP 0.00442 0.00263 0.00315 0.00341 0.00257 0.00294 
 (0.00287) (0.00246) (0.00196) (0.00250) (0.00268) (0.00289) 
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Population 0.111** 0.0610 0.126** 0.0455 0.0520 0.146** 
 (0.0425) (0.106) (0.0633) (0.0524) (0.0886) (0.0678) 
Constant 0.0868 6.272*** 1.098 1.318 7.828*** 2.027 
 (0.687) (1.691) (1.040) (0.851) (1.666) (1.382) 
       
Observations 1,149 1,163 1,163 1,149 1,162 1,162 
R-squared 
Country-Effects 
Time-Fixed 
Effects 
 
0.114 
Yes 
Yes 
0.217 
Yes 
Yes 
0.383 
Yes 
Yes 
0.126 
Yes 
Yes 
0.210 
Yes 
Yes 
0.206 
Yes 
Yes 
Number of 
country 
120 120 120 120 120 120 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Table 3 shows the results obtained from equation (2), where an interaction variable between the 
number of RTAs and type of RTA is added to the baseline models. The types of RTAs included 
are; Customs Union and Free Trade Agreement. These variables measure the compatibility of 
different RTAs with the Trade Facilitation indicators, by showing whether countries related to 
each of these RTAs are influenced more of less by the number of RTAs.  
The results from the Customs Union estimates show statistically positive estimates on the 
documents needed to export and import, with coefficients (0.0938*) and (0.134*) respectively. 
The direct effect of increase in the number of RTAs on documents for exporting for all countries 
is also positively statistically significant at (0.0468**). This shows that a 1% increase in the 
number of RTAs for all countries is 0.0468%, but countries under a customs union face an 
additional effect of 0.0938%. On the other hand, the direct effect of increasing number of RTAs 
on the number of documents required to import is zero for all countries, since the coefficient is 
statistically insignificant, but countries belonging to a customs union face additional costs 
because the number of documents increases by 0.134% as the number of RTAs increase by 1%. 
The possible explanation for these results could be that Custom Unions require harmonization of 
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external trade policies and, more complex negotiations on rules of origin and standards are 
required to export to countries outside the union. These additional requirements increase the 
number of documents needed to export, thus increasing the costs to trade.  
There is also a statistically negative effect on the costs to export and import variable, with 
coefficients (-0.131*) and (-0.0743**) respectively. While the direct effect of number of RTAs 
on costs for exporting, for all countries is 0.06%, countries under a Customs Union have an 
additional reduction in costs of export of 0.08% and import (0.074%), when the number of RTAs 
increase by 1%. The rest of the variables are not statistically significant. A plausible explanation 
could be that since Custom Unions do not require implementation of rules of origin among the 
members, this greatly reduces the cost of import within the Union. It is also possible that costs 
incurred when importing to markets within the union are eliminated at transit points, where 
countries adopt common legislation, standards, etc. Stronger and shared institutional capacities 
as well as infrastructural networks are also likely to reduce costs to trade within the Union, since 
they are easier to implement in a shared geographical location. 
Results for FTAs are not statistically significant. 
Limitations and Caveats 
A huge challenge with estimating the effects of Trade Facilitation is usually determining the 
‘appropriate’ measures that reflect the true needs of a particular region. As earlier highlighted, 
there are various measures that have been proposed by various authors that are expected to affect 
results for particular samples. Notwithstanding the limited data available for each of these 
measures when it comes to low income countries, this paper confines itself to using only three 
trade facilitation indicators. 
Additionally, the diversity of RTAs in terms of their design and structure is something to be 
considered when making this kind of correlation. It is difficult to generalize substantive content 
of Trade Facilitation and its implementation, based on just a few factors. While some RTAs are 
limited to a narrowly defined set of measures, some others are broad in terms of their scope, 
detail and commitment.  It is therefore important to note that there could be better indicators of 
trade facilitation that could be used to show a much more accurate effect of increasing Regional 
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Trade Agreements on Trade Facilitation. Further research is encouraged using a broader set of 
indicators tailored to match the various structures and design of the RTAs. 
It is also worth noting that in this study, heterogeneous factors that could bias results such as 
corruption, level of infrastructure, effectiveness of institutional structures across different 
countries, differentiation of products whereby some products are generally much more difficult 
to clear and import than others, are not accounted for. The obvious reason for this omission is the 
limited data available for these countries. Factors such as corruption and effectiveness of 
institutional structures are generally difficult to measure, especially in developing countries. 
Level of infrastructure is also almost impossible to account for.  
Last but not least, more data could lead to further work concentrated on the form of empirical 
specification required to give a much more precise impact. Further research could be done, to 
include other variables that affect both overlapping trade blocs and trade facilitation such as 
landlockedness, over a longer period of time, to establish a stronger effect.  
Summary and Conclusion 
This study set out with the aim of assessing the effect of overlapping trade blocs on trade 
facilitation, and hopefully add to the literature from prior studies on the empirical relationship 
between the two variables. Using a sample of 120 middle and low income countries over a 
period of 8 years, the results show that conditional on the assumption that both trade facilitation 
and the number of RTAs are continuous variables, an increase in the number of Regional 
Agreements increases trade costs by increasing the number of documents required to export by 
0.05%. From a logical point of view, this result is not surprising because as countries implement 
more RTAs, the more complex the rules and regulations become, and thus more documents 
required in the certification, and verification process. On the other hand, the study also shows 
that time delays in the import and export process decrease by 0.08%. Non-discriminatory trade 
facilitation measures such as improved infrastructure, strong institutional capacity building, 
coupled with increased use of modern technology in the customs clearance process, could be 
some of the reasons explaining these results. These factors when implemented at the regional 
level play a key role in reducing time delays, and thus reducing trade costs. 
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Additional results investigating the compatibility of different types of Regional Trade 
Agreements show that Free Trade Agreements do not seem to have a large statistical effect on 
trade facilitation, a result that is rather surprising. When it comes to Custom Unions however, 
countries related to Custom Unions are negatively affected by an increase in Regional Trade 
Agreements. Results from the study show that the burden of documentary compliance both for 
exporting and importing increases by 0.09% and 0.13% respectively. One could argue that 
factors such as increased complexity in negotiation on standards and rules of origin as well as 
great deal of harmonization of external policies at the Customs Union level could increase the 
burden of documentation required by traders. On the other hand, costs associated with exporting 
and importing are reduced by 0.13% and 0.07% respectively, when a country under a Custom 
union increases its number of RTAs by 1%. Elimination of transit barriers, as well as shared 
institutional capacity and infrastructure could be reasons to explain these results.  
These results are a step further into highlighting the great role that regional trade agreements 
play in affecting trade costs. Without fully exhausting all factors that could affect trade 
facilitation both at the regional and multilateral level, these results give important insight into 
how the increasing overlap and rapid proliferation of Regional Agreements could impact efforts 
geared towards reducing non-tariff trade barriers. Countries need to consider the costs that could 
come with trying to have more trading blocs, and to possibly negotiate trade deals that increase 
rather than diminish International Trade. While Trade Facilitation content might be considered 
broad to implement, there are still measures that are discernable and could be implemented by 
most RTAs. Efforts towards convergence and implementation of non-discriminatory measures of 
Trade Facilitation are therefore highly encouraged at the multilateral and regional level. Capacity 
building and technical assistance is also encouraged especially to less developed countries, as 
well as enforcement of Trade Facilitation commitment across all RTAs.  
The paper also raises the possibility to further investigate the effect of overlapping trade deals 
using appropriate amount of data, larger sample, longer period of study, and a broader set of 
Trade Facilitation indicators. One interesting consideration would be further research into how 
heterogeneous factors such as corruption, level of infrastructure, and effectiveness come into 
play when analysis this effect.  
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Appendix 
SAMPLE COUNTRIES: MIDDLE INCOME AND LOW INCOME COUNTRIES: 
Afghanistan, Albania, Algeria, Angola, Argentina, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Bangladesh, Belarus, 
Belize, Benin, Bhutan, Bolivia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Botswana, Brazil, Burkina Faso, 
Burundi, Cape Verde, Cambodia, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad, China, Colombia, 
Comoros, Congo-Dem. Rep., Congo-Rep., Costa Rica, Côte d’Ivoire, Cuba, Djibouti, Dominica, 
Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt-Arab rep., El Salvador, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, 
Ethiopia, Fiji, Gabon, The Gambia, Georgia, Ghana, Grenada, Guatemala, Guinea, Guinea-
Bissau, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, India, Indonesia, Iran-Islamic Rep., Iraq, Jamaica, Jordan, 
Kazakhstan, Kenya, Kiribati, Korea-Dem. People’s Rep., Kosovo, Kyrgyz Republic, Lao PDR, 
Lebanon, Lesotho, Liberia, Libya, Macedonia-FYR, Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Maldives, 
Mali, Marshall Islands, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mexico, Micronesia-Fed. Sts., Moldova, 
Mongolia, Montenegro, Morocco, Mozambique, Myanmar, Namibia, Nauru, Nepal, Nicaragua, 
Niger, Nigeria, Pakistan, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Russian 
Federation, Rwanda, Samoa, São Tomé and Principe, Senegal, Serbia, Sierra Leone, Solomon 
Islands, Somalia, South Africa, South Sudan, Sri Lanka, St. Lucia, St. Vincent and the 
Grenadines, Sudan, Suriname, Swaziland, Syrian Arab Republic, Tajikistan, Tanzania, Thailand, 
Timor-Leste, Togo, Tonga, Yemen-Rep., Zambia, Zimbabwe 
Table 4: Key Variables and Sources. 
No. Variable Data source 
1 Trade Facilitation Indicators World Bank’s Doing Business indicators 
http://www.doingbusiness.org 
Doing Business records the time and cost associated with 
the logistical process of exporting and importing goods. 
Under the new methodology introduced this year, Doing 
Business measures the time and cost (excluding tariffs) 
associated with three sets of procedures—documentary 
compliance, border compliance and domestic transport—
within the overall process of exporting or importing a 
shipment of goods.  
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2.  Regional Trade Agreements World Trade Organization (WTO). 
WTO is the only global International organization 
dealing with rules of trade between nations. At the heart 
are the WTO agreements, negotiated and signed by the 
bulk of the world’s trading nations and ratified in their 
parliaments.   
3. Gross Domestic Product 
(GDP) 
 
World Development Indicators. 
http://www.worldbank.org/ 
World Development Indicators (WDI) is the primary 
World Bank collection of development indicators, 
compiled from officially recognized international 
sources. It presents the most current and accurate global 
development data available, and includes national, 
regional and global estimates.  
4. Population United Nations Population Division Database 
 
 
 
 
 
